Photonics based perfect secrecy cryptography : toward fully classical implementations by Mazzone, Valerio et al.
Photonics based perfect secrecy cryptography: towards fully classical
implementations
Valerio Mazzone,1 Andrea Di Falco,2 Al Cruz,3 and Andrea Fratalocchi⇤4
1)Department of Physics, University of Zurich, Winterthurerstrasse 190, 8057 Zurich,
Switzerland
2)School of Physics and Astronomy, University of St. Andrews, North Haugh, St. Andrews KY16 9SS,
UK
3)Center for Unconventional Processes of Sciences (CUP Science), 6475 E Pacific Coast Highway, Los Angeles, California 90803,
USA
4)PRIMALIGHT, Faculty of Electrical Engineering; Applied Mathematics and Computational Science,
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, Thuwal 23955-6900, Saudi Arabia.
⇤ Corresponding author. Email: andrea.fratalocchi@kaust.edu.sa
(Dated: 18 June 2020)
Developing an unbreakable cryptography is a longstanding question and a global challenge in the internet era. Pho-
tonics technologies are at the frontline of research, aiming at providing the ultimate system capable of ending the
cybercrime industry by changing the way information is treated and protected now and in the long run. Such perspective
discusses some of the current challenges as well as opportunities that classical and quantum systems open in the field
of cryptography as both a science and an engineering.
WHY PERFECT SECRECY?
In the old days of the Roman empire, Julius Caesar used
a type of substitution cipher by codifying secret messages in
which each character is shifted three places down the alpha-
bet, thus reporting one of the first historical evidence of the
use of cryptography to protect classified information1. Today,
with an information society that transmits one billion Tbytes
every year, securing the privacy of confidential data is a global
challenge2,3.
Currently, the majority of cryptosystems’ security does not
rely on unconditional proofs, but on mathematical or proba-
ble statements. The main idea centers on security margins: if
a code is broken with n resources, the code is modified, e.g.,
by doubling the length of its key, so that the required resources
increase exponentially. This model is vulnerable to techno-
logical development and does not protect users from the past:
an attacker can store the information sent out today and wait
for the right technology in order to crack the message tomor-
row. History shows that this systematically happens on shorter
timescales than what could possibly be predicted.
The most famous example is perhaps the breaking of the
enigma machine, which was an encryption typewriter used
during the second world war to transmit top secret military
information. Because of the large number of combinations at
the basis of the encrypted code, the enigma was considered
unbreakable.
Notwithstanding, such security conjecture crumbled with the
work of Alan Turing and his colleagues who cracked the
enigma by engineering the first architectural computer, which
was secretly used until the end of the war4. In this exam-
ple, the security was broken and not publicly disclosed, al-
lowing one party to freely break into the private information
of the other, completely unnoticed. Another case is the US
federal data encryption standard (DES), which was consid-
ered secure because a machine fast enough to break it was
prohibitively expensive5. This probable argument did not pre-
dict the subsequent price revolution in integrated electronics,
which after just twenty years allowed cracking the code6. The
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which superseded the
DES, was introduced in 2002. Within only seven years a
realistic attack has been found to suggest a complete revi-
sion of its security margins7, while several attacks have been
publicly disclosed on its practical implementations8–10. The
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem, introduced in
1977, was considered unbreakable and it is currently in use for
encrypting emails, internet and digital transactions. The RSA
security conjecture was broken in less than 20 years by Pe-
ter Shor, who developed a quantum computing-based strategy
that can also crack many other crypto-systems in use today,
shifting current discussions towards post-quantum cryptogra-
phy scenarios11,12.
These few examples demonstrate that security conjectures of
today are proven unreliable tomorrow, and require continuous
revisions of standards that, if not addressed timely, expose the
privacy of our present and past communications. To solve this
problem permanently, cryptologists developed a third model
of security, known as perfect secrecy. Perfect secrecy has been
defined by Claude Shannon as13:
“...a system that after a cryptogram is intercepted by the en-
emy the a posteriori probabilities of this cryptogram repre-
senting various messages be identically the same as the a
priori probabilities of the same messages before the intercep-
tion.”
In this system, an attacker cannot do better than to best guess
the message without having seen it, while the secrecy of
the information being communicated is unconditionally “per-
fect”.
It might be surprising to know that a perfect secrecy cryptog-
raphy has existed for a century , but it has not been adopted in
practice yet. This cryptography system has been known as the
Vernam cipher or the one-time pad (OTP)14, and it is based
on four conditions: i) the users share an identical random key
that is as long as the message, ii) the key is kept secret, iii) the
2FIG. 1. Schematic algorithm Of the BB84 protocol. a) Communication setup. b) Key generation scheme. Reprinted with permission from
Xiao-Ling Pang et al., Physical Review Applied, 13, 034008 (2020). Copyright 2020 by the American Physical Society.
key is never reused, iv) each key is uncorrelated to the others.
Shannon rigorously demonstrated that a cryptography satisfy-
ing i)-iv) can never be beaten.
Given the OTP, the crux that limited the adoption of the
scheme relates to implementing the key distribution step at
points i) and ii). The question is to solve the following prob-
lem: if two users have at disposal a secure channel to transmit
a one time key that is as long as the message, the users would
rather use the channel to send the message and not the key. In
this security model the question has shifted from transmitting
secure texts to distribute secure keys among different users.
LEVERAGING ON THE LAWS OF PHYSICS
As it happens in science, the solution to an apparently lock-
down problem in one field is obtained by borrowing concepts
from other scientific areas. In this case, a solution path to-
wards implementing key distribution through the physics of
quantum light was suggested by Bennett and Brassard in the
BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol15.
In the scheme (Fig. 1a), one user (Alice) generates bit se-
quences from randomly polarized single photons among four
different angular directions, then she sends the sequence to the
second user (Bob). After the sequence exchange, Alice and
Bob compare the measures over a public classical channel, ex-
tracting a key from the sequence of correlated states (Fig. 1b).
While the random nature of the data being exchanged with
the BB84 does not make it possible to directly communicate
a message, it allows to perform the key distribution to imple-
ment the OTP.
The security of the BB84 scheme leverages on the projection
postulate of quantum mechanics: any measures performed
on traveling photons will statistically change the photons po-
larization, introducing uncorrelated states between Alice and
Bob that can be identified and discarded, leaving the attacker
with zero information.
In the last forty years, the progress of QKD increased enor-
mously, ranging from a large variety of mathematical al-
gorithms for amplifying the privacy16–20, to authenticating
schemes21–25 and to systems design26–37. However, despite
significant advances, the implementation of QKD has chal-
lenges, notably lack of speed, high costs and low scalabil-
ity of quantum communication networks. For distances be-
yond 100 km, QKD’s communication bit rate is currently
limited in the range of 100 bit/s38, thus requiring expensive
single-photons detectors operating at tens of degree below
zero39,40. Other challenges involve implementation-related
attacks, originating from the fact that the unbreakability of
QKD is evaluated for ideal quantum communication channels,
ideal quantum sources and detectors41,42. Practical implemen-
tations are not ideal, opening QKD schemes to different vul-
nerabilities43–47.
A BLAST FROM CHAOS AND THERMODYNAMICS
If a method and system to incorporate QKD into a fully
classical optical communication network became possible,
Quantum network limitations would be overcome. In this
sense, most of QKD development would be retained, all the
while enabling the “last mile” with the benefits of classical
optical communications. Classical optical networks currently
enable data transfer rates up to Terabits per seconds (Tbps)48,
global transmission distance covering the entire planet with
contained costs2,49, and ultrafast switching technology for de-
multiplexing different users50–52.
In the recent work53 the authors demonstrate that such method
and system indeed is feasible. They addressed the limita-
tions of QKD and demonstrated solutions by using the theory
of chaos formulated for thermodynamic irreversible systems.
There is an intimate connection between quantum mechan-
ics and chaos, which was initially explored by A. Einstein54.
While a quantum system is in general unpredictable because
any taken measure would force the system to collapse into an
eigenstate chosen with random probability, a classical chaotic
3FIG. 2. A classical version of BB84. (a) Communication setup on a classical public optical channel. (b) Communication and key generation
steps. (c) Encryption and decryption scheme via bitwise XOR between the text and the generated key. Adapted with permission from Di Falco,
A. et al., “Perfect secrecy cryptography via mixing of chaotic waves in irreversible time-varying silicon chips”. Nat Commun 10, 5827 (2019),
under license CC BY-SA 4.0.
system is equivalently unpredictable because each implemen-
tation is never identical; thus it is mathematically impossible
to anticipate the system’s evolution55.
By leveraging on this property, the algorithm in53 proposes a
classical version of the BB84 QKD scheme by using chaotic
correlated wavepackets generated from thermodynamic irre-
versible random media (Fig. 2). In this system, Alice and
Bob employ two different chips (Fig. 2a) composed of time
varying distribution of scatterers, which are implemented by
etching holes in a silicon on insulator (SOI) platform. The
chips are connected to two broadband light sources SA and
SB, which are different for each user (Fig. 2a). The sources
differences set the desired bit error rate (BER) for the com-
munication. Each user can independently vary the input con-
ditions An and Bn of light injected into the chips at every step
i of the communication. Different input conditions play the
role of different polarization states in the BB84 scheme. In
the chaotic chips of Fig. 2, the number of input conditions
is not limited to four and grows linearly with the size of the
chips53. To couple a broadband light pulse into the chip at
ultrafast speed it is possible to use directly addressable 1⇥N
fiber bundles, which are commercially available and can also
be manufactured directly in the chip.
At each communication step (Fig. 2b), Alice and Bob
choose randomly a coupling waveguide, then send the spec-
tra An(i) and Bn( j) in the public channel, detecting at each
end the combined power density spectrum |An(i)  Bn( j)|2
and |Bn( j) An(i)|2, respectively (  is the operator that com-
bines the states after the propagation over the channel). If the
status of the chips and that of the channel do not change dur-
ing each communication step, then system is reciprocal and
|An(i) Bn( j)|2 = |Bn( j) An(i)|2. In the following commu-
nication step, Alice and Bob independently decide whether to
change the coupling waveguide and/or chip status or to repeat
the sending and acquisition procedure. The steps are repeated
as many times as required. At the end of the exchange, fol-
lowing the same idea of BB84, Alice and Bob communicate
openly which steps have been repeated, and extract the re-
spective signal by identifying a sequence of repeated spectra,
which are digitized into an OTP key (Fig. 2c). Once the key is
generated, the two chips are changed in time by an irreversible
transformation. This transformation is applied independently
by each user and it is not disclosed. A second irreversible
transformation is applied prior to the next communication.
The above scheme implements conditions i)-iv) of the OTP:
it allows the ultrafast transmission of a key that is as long as
the message via classical optical communications; it gener-
ates completely uncorrelated keys in the complex scattering
chips; it does not disclose the key to the attacker; it never
reuses the same key. As in the BB84 QKD protocol, the se-
curity of this scheme is dictated by the laws of physics. The
second law of thermodynamics does not permit to an attacker
to duplicate the chips once the communication takes place, as
it would require to invert an irreversible physical transforma-
tion, and the mathematical unpredictability of chaos makes it
impossible for an enemy to reconstruct the correlated states
|An(i) Bn( j)|2 and |Bn( j) An(i)|2, which can be observed
only in the isolated network connecting the two users. A third
person who tries to obtain the same states by measuring the
data flowing in the communication line, in fact, will inevitably
perturb the system. This action always results in one bit of un-
certainty for every bit measured, regardless the type of attack
employed or the type of instrumentation used53.
In analogy to the BB84 scheme, active manipulation of the
states generates uncorrelated sequences that can be isolated
and removed with the many techniques of privacy amplifica-
4tion and error reconciliation already developed for QKD. An
advantage of this scheme compared to BB84 is that any non-
ideal component present in the experimental realization sums
up to increase the unpredictability of the system, and it does
not furnish vulnerabilities53.
It is interesting to discuss the technological requirements of
the chip with respect to experimental implementations with
different platforms, communication speed and scalability. In
the scheme of Fig. 2, the OTP key length is proportional to
the bandwidth of the spectrum, which in turn limits the max-
imum transmission rate B because of the fiber dispersion and
the associated pulse broadening. An accepted rule of thumb
is B 14Dt , where Dt =D ·L ·Dl is the pulse broadening fac-
tor with D the dispersion, L the length of the fiber and Dl
the pulse bandwidth. For a single mode fiber with dispersion
D= 1 ps/(km ·nm) and length L= 100 km, the safe transmis-
sion of pulses with bandwidth Dl = 100 nm can be as fast as
Bmax = 25 Mb/s. This value is 2 · 105 faster than the current
best rate of QKD.
These figures give the upper boundaries for the speed required
for the input waveguide switch. Current integrated waveguide
arrays can be dynamically tuned using thermal, mechanical,
electrical or all optical methods, with associated switching
speed up to tens of fs56, which is abundantly faster than the
transmission requirements.
The state of the individual chips can be changed e.g. by coat-
ing the surface of the chip with colloidal scatterers dispersed
in a solution, delivered by a microfluidic channel, allowing a
material/s to be continuously deformed by external conditions
such as temperature and light.
Another important factor is the number of uncorrelated chan-
nels that can be addressed at the input of the scattering sec-
tion. In53 it is demonstrated that shifting the input beam by
200 nm is enough to create uncorrelated transmission spec-
tra. The aforementioned shows the possibility to scale up to
0.03 ·Nb·Tb of different keys —with Nb the number of bits
extracted from each spectrum— for every mm of width of the
chip and prior to every irreversible transformation.
Future work includes coupling the above mentioned system to
authentication schemes, addressing the security gaps that will
be increasing with the evolution of society in the near future
with the advent of e.g., Smart City, Internet-of-Things (IoT),
Cloud Computing, Big Data, and especially the tendency that
biometrics systems will be everywhere in the society.
LOOKING FORWARD
Developing unconditionally secure communications is an
exciting journey that has been pursued for thousands of years,
and that is not yet concluded. While there are still plenty
of challenges, there are also a large number of opportunities
for developing applications that could counteract a six tril-
lion dollar cybercrime industry57. If perfect secrecy were to
fundamentally impact society, it will need to offer ultrafast re-
sources at a reasonable cost for users connected everywhere.
“Criminals are using every technology tool at their disposal to
hack into people’s accounts. If they know there’s a key hidden
somewhere, they won’t stop until they find it58.” (Tim Cook,
Apple CEO).
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